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808 IN JLl!l MARTINEZ (52 C.2d : 
[Crim. No. 6343. In Bank. Oct. 30, 1959.] 
Jnre RUDOLPH BROWN MARTINEZ, on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Oriminal Law-Plea-How Pnt in-Guilty-Right to Oounsel. 
-The evidence supported a referee's finding that defendant 
was aware of his right to counsel on the date he pleaded guilty 
of robbery and burglary where he was informed of his right 
to counsel at his preliminary examination and again when he 
was brought before the superior court for arraignment, at 
which time he was given a continuance to obtain counsel, 
where he was present when counsel was appointed for his 
codefendants after they stated that they had no money, where 
at his actual arraignment he appeared with counsel and his 
right to counsel was recited to him for a third time, and 
where, when he entered his plea of guilty, he stated in effect 
that he wished to proceed without his attorney. 
[2a,2b] Id.-Plea-How Put in-Guilty-Right to Oounsel.-The 
evidence supported a referee's finding that defendant freely 
and intelligently waived his right to counsel on the date he 
pleaded guilty of robbery and burglary where allegations that 
the district attorney threatened him with prosecution as an 
habitual criminal unless he changed his plea and that he prom-
ised him a recommendation of leniency and medical care for al-
leged narcotic withdrawal symptoms if he pleaded guilty were 
directly contradicted by the district attorney, who testified that 
no such representations were made and that he had never vis-
ited the prisoner in jail, where there was no evidence to support 
an inference of impropriety on the part of any representative 
of the state except the fact that defendant changed his plea 
without notice to his attorney of record, and where defendant's 
statement that since he had been caught in the act of robbery 
"there was no doubt" of his guilt, his knowledge that his co-
defendants had pleaded guilty and had been promptly sent to 
prison, and his expressed desire to avoid wasting any more 
"dead time" while awaiting trial fully explained the change 
of plea and precluded any inference of coercioD or improper 
inducement. 
[1] Plea of guilty as affected by objection that it was not made 
by defendant personally, note, 110 A.L.R. 1300. See also Oal.Jur.2d, 
Criminal Law, § 244; Am.Jur., Crimfnal Law, §§ 257, 269 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5, 6, 10] Criluillul Law, § 202; [3] 
Habeas Corpus, §62.1; [4] Attorneys, §44; [7] Criminal Law, 
§ 202; Attorneys, § 44; [8, 9] Habeas Corpus, § 34(1). 
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r:q Babeu Corpus· Bea.ring - Evidenc~. Although not binding 
on t.he Rupreme l'ourt, findings of fnct mllde by a referee 
in an original habens corpus proceeding lire entitled to great 
weight. 
[4] Attorneys-Substitution of.-The procedure set forth in Code 
Civ. Proc., §§ 284, 285, for a change of attorneys applies to 
criminal as well as civil actions, and it is error to permit 
defendant to proceed in person, withdraw his plea of not guilty . 
and plead guilty in the attorney's absence and without his con- i 
sent so long as he remains attorney of record. \ 
[6] Criminal Law-Plea-Row Put in-Guilty-Right to Counsel. I 
-The trial court erred in accepting from defendant a plea 
of guilty of robbery and burglary without complying with 
Pen. Code, § 1018, declaring that no plea of guilty of a felony 
shall be received where defendant is not represented by counsel 
unless the court shall "first fully inform him of his right to 
counsel." This requirement was not met by informing de-
fendant of his right to counsel at and prior to his arraignment, 
almost six weeks before, since the statute was designed to 
ensure that a defendant appearing without counsel is aware of 
his right to counsel at the time he pleads guilty. 
[8] Id.-Plea-Row Put in-Guilty-Right to Counsel.-The find-
ing required by Pen. Code, § 1018, when a plea of guilty of 
a felony is received from a defendant not represented by 
counsel, that "defendant understands his right to counsel and 
freely waives it," cannot be implied where defendant's change 
of plea from not guilty to guilty and his wish to proceed 
without counsel were presented to the trial court with no 
explanation other than the prosecutor's statement that he was 
informed that defendant wished to be taken into court as 
early as possible, and where the court made no inquiry to 
discover whether defendant had the experience and mental 
capacity to understand his rights or to determine whether 
his decision was the result of an intelligent choice freely made 
by him or of improper influences brought to bear on him. 
[7] Id.-Plea-Row Put in: Attorneys-Substitution of.-Failure 
to comply with the requirements of Pen. Code, § 1018, relating 
to plea of guilty of a felony, and of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 284, 
285, relating to change of attorneys, did not compel vacating 
a judgment of cOllviction of first degree robbery and burglary 
where these procedural errors did not result in any deprivation 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 91; Am.Jur., Habells 
Corpus, § 147 et seq. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 175 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
.Attorneys at Law, § 44. 
CJ 
810 IN RE MARTINEZ [52 C.2d 
of the constit.ut.ional right to counsel ann whf're that right 
hllll hr",n frrply IIni! intf'llig-ent.ly \l'lli~pd. 
[8] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence. 
-Where the right to counsel has been freely and intelligently 
waived, a judgment of conviction will not be vacated on 
habeas corpus for failure to comply with the requirements of 
P.en. Code, § 1018, relating to plea of guilty of a felony, and 
of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 284, 285, relating to change of attorneys, 
since this would serve only as an admonition to the, trial 
courts in other cases, which is not a proper function of the writ. 
[9a, 9b] Id.-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.-A judg-
lUent of conviction of a felony should not be vacateu on habeas 
corpus for failure to comply with the requirements of Pell. 
Code, * lOIS, relating to plea of guilty of a felony, without I 
determining that defendant had not authorized or adopted . 
counsel's statement of his plea, since if he had authorized or i 
adopted counsel's statement of his plea no purpose other than 
admonition would be served by setting aside the judgment on 
habeas corpus. (Disapproving In re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 235 
[328 P.2d 465], and In re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [233 P. 390], 
to the extent that they hold that a judgment must be vacated 
even if defendant authorized or adopted counsel's statement 
of his plea.) 
[10] Criminal Law-Plea-How Put in-Guilty.-The purpose of 
the requirement of Pen. Code, § 1018, that a plea of guilty of 
a felony must be put in by defendant personally, is to ensure 
that the plea is his own. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ denied. 
Gladys Towles Root, Eugene V. McPherson and Robert 
Barnett for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, and Stanley Mosk, Attorneys General, 
Doris H. Maier, Deputy Attorney General, Roy A. Gustafson, 
District Attorney (Ventura), and Woodruff J. Deem, Deputy 
District Attorney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of ,habeas corpus 
on be]laH of Rudolph Brown Martinez, an inmate of the Cali-
fornia State Prison at Folsom. Martinez il'; held under a 
judgment of conviction entered on his plea of guilty of rob-
bery and burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 459), both of whieh 
the court found to be in the first dpgrep.. He al~o admitted 
that he was armed with a deadly WNlpOIl at the tim" (If the 
() 
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offenses. The petition charges that his conviction was oh-
tained in violation of his constitutional right to counscl. 
It appears from the transcripts of the proceedings in the 
trial court that Martinez was arraigned and entered a 
plea of not guilty to the offenses charged in the information 
on September 4, 1956. At that time he was represented b~­
petitioner as attorney of record. Trial was set for September 
27th, but on September 26th the trial was reset for Octobcr 
22d for the convenience of petitioner. On October 9th 
Martinez appeared in court without counsel, stated his will-
ingness to proceed without counsel, withdrew his plea of 
not guilty, entered a plea of guilty, admitted that he was 
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the offenses, 
waived a presentence report, waived time for sentencing, 
and agreed that he had no legal excuse to offer why judgment 
should not be pronounced against him according to law. The 
court accepted the deputy district attorney's recommendation 
that the sentences run concurrently and pronounced judgmcnt 
accordingly_ 
Petitioner contends that Martinez did not freely and intelli-
gently waive his constitutional right to counsel at the time 
he entered his plea of guilty and that his conviction was 
therefore obtained in violation of that right. (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 13; People v. Chesser, 29 Ca1.2d 815 [178 P.2d 761, 
170 A.L.R. 246J ; In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701 [108 P.2d 10].) 
We issued an order to show cause why the writ should not be 
granted and appointed a referee to take evidence and makc. 
findings as to whether Martinez understood his right to counsel 
and freely waived it when he pleaded guilty on October 9, 
1956. The referee found that Martinez understood his right 
to be represented by counsel on that date, that there was no 
improper coercion or inducement to elicit the plea of guilty, 
and that he was mentally competent to waive his right to 
counsel. Petitioner has filed objections to these findings. 
[1] The record of the referee's hearing discloses that 
Martinez was informed of his right to counsel at his pre-
liminary examination on August 28th and Again when hc 
was brought before the superior court for arraignment on 
Aug-l1st 30th; that on August 30th lie was givf'n a continuance 
to oMain ('ollnsel; that he was pres<'nt whf'n COUllsf'l was ap-
pointe!l for· his ('o(leff'll<lants aft(·r tll!')'" statNl tllat they had 
110 mOll<'Y j allrl t.llat at his actual arraig-nmf'lIt on September 
4th he appcarNl with ('ollnscl Rnd his right to conm;el was 
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recited to him for a third time. When he entered his plea or 
guilty he stated in effect that he wished to proceed without 
his attorncy. In the light of these facts, his previous court-
room experience, and his admissions at the referee's hearing, 
there can be no doubt that he was well aware of his right to 
·counsel on the date he pleaded guilty. 
. [2&] There is also ample evidence to support the finding 
that Martinez freely and intelligently waived that right. The 
allegations that the district attorney threatened him with 
prosecution as an habitual criminal unless he changed his plea 
and that he promised him a recommendation of leniency and 
medical care for alleged narcotic withdrawal symptoms if 
he pleaded guilty were directly contradicted by the district 
attorncy, who testified that no such representations were 
made and that he had never visited the prisoner in jail. Therc 
was thus presented a clear-cut question of credibility, which 
the referee decided adversely to Martinez, and which we find 
no reason to decide differently. Moreover, there is no credible 
evidence to support an inference of impropriety on the part 
of any representative of the state except the fact that Martinez 
changed his plea without notice to his attorney of record. 
Martinez' statement that since he had been caught in the act 
of robbery, "there was no doubt" of his guilt, his knowledge 
that his codefendants had pleaded guilty and had been 
promptly sent to prison, and his expressed desire to avoid 
wasting any more "dead time" while awaiting trial, fully 
explain the change of plea and preclude any inference of 
coercion or improper inducement. . 
Finally, in the light of the testimony of the expert medical 
witness and Martinez' description of his own symptoms, we 
agree with the referee that there is no substance to petitioner's 
claim that Martinez was incapable of intelligently waiving 
his right to counsel because he was suffering from narcotic 
withdrawal symptoms at that time. 
[3] Although not binding on this COlut, the findings of 
fact made by a referee are entitled to great weight. (In re 
Allen, 47 Ca1.2d 55, 57 [301 P.2d 577]; In TO Mitchell, 35 
Ca1.2d 849, 855 [221 P.2d 689] ; In re De La Roi, 27 Cal.2d 
354,364 [164 P.2d 10].) [2b] We have concluded that the 
foregoing evidence fully supports the referee's decision and 
we therefore find that Martinez understood and freely waived 
his right to counsel on the date he pleadcd guilty. A.ccoru-
ingly, the judgment based thereon cannot be set aside Oil 
o 
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the grounrl that Ma,·tinf>7. \Vas dl'privl'd 6f his "ollstillllional 
right to connsel. Thc only 'lllcstion rcmaining, lhcl'cful'l', is 
whethcr the violation of certain statutory provisions compels 
vacating the jUdgmeut. 
[4] The trial court erred in permitting Martinez to with-
draw his plea of not guilty and plead guilty in petitioner's 
absence and without his consent so long as he remained 
attorney of reeord. '1'he procedure set forth in sections 2841 
and 2852 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a change of 
attorney applies to criminal as well as civil actions. (People 
v. Bouchard, 49 Ca1.2d 438, 440-441 [317 P.2d 971] ; see Code 
Civ. Proc., §§ 22, 24.) Petitioner did not consent to a change 
of attorney, no notice was given him until after the final 
judgment, and no order for a change of attorney was entered ; 
by the court. Thus petitioner remained attorney of record, 
and the trial court erred in allowing Martinez to proceed in 
person. (People v. Merkouris j 46 Ca1.2d 540, 554-555 [297 
P.2d 999].) 
[5] The trial court also erred in accepting a plea of guilty 
from Martinez without fully complying with section 1018 
of the Penal Code.lI The following colloquy shows substantial 
compliance with. the requirement of that section that the de-
fendant state to the court "that he does not wish to be repre-
sented by counseL" "MR. HOLZAUER: [the prosecuting at-
torney] ... So although Mr. McPherson has represented :MI'. 
Martinez previously, if it is Mr. Martinez's desire to proceed 
now in the absence of Mr. McPherson, I can see no objection 
"'The attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at 
any time before or after judgment or final determination, as follows; 
"1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, 
or entered upon the minutes; 
"2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client 
or attorney, after notice from one to the other ..•• " 
." When an attorney is changed, as provided in the last section, writ· 
ten notice of the change and of the substitution of a new attorney, or 
of the appearance of the party in person, must be given to the adverse 
llarty. Until then he must recognize the former attorney." 
'" Unless otherWise provided by law every plea mlUlt be put in by th~ 
defendant himself in open court. No plea of guilty of a felony for which 
t.he maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who does not 
appear with cOllnsel, nor shall any plea of guilty of any other felony 
he accepted from any defendant who does not appear with counsel unless 
the court shall first fully inform him of his right to counsel and unle~R 
the court shall find that the defendant understands his right to e.ounsel 
and freely waives it and then, only if the defendant has e~pressly stated 
in open court, to the court, that he does not wish to be represented by 
cOllnsel. ... " 
o 
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to that. THE COURT: Are you willing to proceed now t THE 
DEFENDANT: That's right. MR. HOLZAUER: It is your desire 
to proceed now 1 THE DEFENDANT: That's right." 
There was no adequate compliance, however, with the re-
quirement that the court "first fully inform him of his right 
to 0 counsel." It is true that Martinez was told of his right 
at and prior to his arraignment. The statute, however, was 
designed to ensure that a defendant appearing without counsel 
is aware of his right to counsel at the time he pleads guilty, 
It is not met by instructions given almost six weeks before 
that time. 
[6] Finally, the required finding that "defendant under-
stands his right to counsel and freely waives it" was not 
expressly made by the trial judge and under the circum-
stances cannot be implied. Martinez' change of plea and his 
wish to proceed without counsel were presented to the trial 
court with no explanation other than the following statement 
by the prosecutor: ", .. I was informed lfr. Martinez wished 
to be taken into court as early as possible, and I caused an 
officer to go down to the jail to verify that that was, in fact, 
Mr. Martinez's wish and I was assured that he did wish to 
be taken into court." The court lllade no inquiry to discover 
whether Martinez had the experience and mental capacity to 
understand his rights or to determine whether his decision 
was the result of an intelligent choice freely made by him 
or of improper influences theretofore brought to bear upon 
him. (Of. 111 re Be1'ry,43 Cal.2d 838,841-843 [279 P.2d 18], 
footnote.) Thus there is nothing in the record to suggest 
an awareness of the statutory requirement, let alone an at-
tempt to comply with it. 
o [7] We have concluded, however, that since these pro-
cedural errors did not result in any deprivation of the eon-
stitutional right to eounsel, they do not eompel vacating the 
judgment. The only relevant purpose of section 1018 of the 
Penal Code and sections 284 and 285 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure is to secure the right to representation by counsel. 
(See Boca etc. R.R. 00. v. Superior Oourt, 150 Cal. 153, 156 
[88 P. 7181; Board of Oommissioners v. Younger, 29 Cal. 
147, 150 [87 Am.Del'. 164].) When that right has been freely 
and intelligently waived, the defendant has not been deprived 
of any right that the statutes are designed to Sf'enre. [8] Va-
cation of the judgment on habeas corpus under these circum-
stanC'es would serve only as an admonition to trial I'OUl'ts in 
() 
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other cascs. That is not a proper function of the writ. (See 
Tn re McInturff, 37 CaJ.2d 876, 880-881 [236 P.2d 574] ; In "6 
LincUell, 29 Ca1.2d 709, 722-723 [177 ·P.2d 918]; In re Bell. 
19 Ca1.2d 488, 492-495 [122 P.2d 22].) It must be presume,l 
that trial courts will ordinarily insist on compliance with 
these statutory provisions and thereby discourage groundless 
collateral attacks on final judgments of conviction. 
[9a.] It is true that convictions have been set aside on 
habeas corpus for failure of the trial court to require com-
pliance with the provision in section 1018 of the Penal Code 
that a plea must be put in by defendant personally, even 
though the plea was entered by defendant's counsel in de-
fendant's presence and without objection by him. (I'll re 
BI"l'c 71 , 162 Ca1.App.2d 235 [328 P.2d 465] ; Tn re Brain, 70 
Cal.App. 334 [233 P. 390].) If those cases were correctly 
decided, the judgment should be vacated in the present case, 
for there is no 1110re reason in the former than in the latter 
to vacate the judgment without inquiry as to whether the 
right secured by the statute had in fact been violated. [10] The 
purpose of the requirement that a plea be entered by defend-
ant personally is to ensure that the plea is his own. If it is, 
the purpose of that requirement is accomplished, just as the 
purpose of the provisions to secure the right to counsel is 
accomplished when the defendant freely and intelligently 
waives that right. [9b] Accordingly, in those cases the 
court should not have declared the judgment void without 
determining t.hat the defendant had not authorized or adopted 
counsel's statement of his plea. If he had authorized or 
adopted counsel's statement of his plea, no purpose other 
than admonition was served by setting aside the judgment on 
habeas corpus. I'll re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 235 [328 P.2d 
465], and I'll re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [233 P. 390], are 
therefore disapproved to the extent that they hold that a 
judgment must be vacated even if the defendaut authorized 
or adopted counsel's statement of his plea. 
The petition for habeas corpus is denied1 and the order to 
show cause is discharged. 
Gibson, C. J., and White, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred in the 
judgment. 
PETERS, J., Conem'ring and Dissenting.-I concur with 
the opinion of Mr. Just.iee Tl'a~'nor insofAr as it holds that it 
o 
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was error not to comply with sections 284 and 285 of the Cod(! 
of Civil Procedure. I also concur with that opinion insofar 
as it holds that it was error for the trial court not to comply 
with the proyisiol1s of section 1018 of the Penal Code. How-
ever, I dissent from that opinion insofar as it classifies such 
errors as being merely "procedural," and insofar as it holds 
that such errors did not adversely affect "the constitutional 
right to counsel. " 
The facts upon which I predicate my dissent are as fol-
lows: When arraigned on September 4, 1956, Martinez was 
represented by counsel. This was known to the trial judge 
and to the prosecutor. It was a matter of record. Thereafter, 
the record shows, the district attorney's office had certain 
negotiations with the lawyer for Martinez. Sometime later 
the district attorney's office was "contacted" by the wife of 
Martinez and "received a message" which, if written, was 
never produced, that Martinez desired to plead guilty. The 
wife denied getting in touch with the district attorney. At 
any rate, the district attorney sent his chief investigator to 
interview Martinez to ascertain if the latter desired to plead 
guilty. The attorney for Martinez was not present at, nor 
was he notified of, that interview. Thereafter, the district 
attorney ordered the sheriff to pr!>duce Martinez in court. 
Counsel for Martinez was not notified of this hearing. Before 
the court session started the prosecutor interviewed Martinez 
and, among other things, asked him· if he wanted to discharge 
his attorney. 
All of this was, of course, highly: improper. The propriety 
of the prosecuting officials thus communicating with an ac-
cused, and questioning him, without his lawyer being present, 
when they knew that he had a lawyer, was improper. In 
civil litigation it would be a serious breach of cthics for a 
lawyer representing one side of a case to communicate and 
question the adverse party witho~t at least notification to 
the lawyer for the adverse party. This rule applies with 
even greater vigor to a criminal case. 
Independently of this invasion of the rights of Martinez, I 
there were other violations of his constitutional rights of an 
even more serious nature. 
On October 9, 1956, when Martinez was brought into court 
and stated that he was willing to proceed without counsel, 
'lS already pointed out, his attorney was not notified. Tht~ 
record shows that the trial court arid the pt'osecutor were then 
o 
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rully aware of the fact that Martinez had a lawyer. But, in 
spite of this fact, Martinez, without counsel, was permitted 
to withdraw his plea of not guilty, to enter a plea of guilty, to 
admit being armed with a' deadly weapon, to waive a pre-
sentence report, to waive time for sentencing and to agree 
that judgment should be immediately pronounced against him .• 
. The majority holds that because the evidence produced ' 
before the referee shows that Martinez waived his constitu-
tional right to counsel, and understood what he was doing 
at the hearing on October 9th, his right to counsel was not 
interfered with, and that the failure to comply with sections 
284 and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a mere 
procedural error not warranting the issue of the writ of ! 
habeas corpus. 
This reasoning disregards one of the obvious purposes and I 
intents of the two code sections. The Constitution of this state I 
(art. I, § 13) grants to an accused the right "to appear and 
defend, in person and with counsel." Thus, an accused has 
an undoubted constitutional right to appear without counsel, 
and to waive his right to counsel. But such accused also has 
the right to appear by counsel. The Legislature, in aid of that 
constitutional right, has provided that once counsel has been 
appointed he may be removed only as provided in sections 
284 and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1 Section 284 
requires a consent by client and counsel filed with the clerk 
or an order of court after notice to the client and counsel. 
Until these sections are complied with petitioner remained 
the attorney of record and it was error to permit Martinez 
to proceed in person. (People v. Mer-kouns, 46 Cal.2d 540, 554 
[297 P.2d 999].) The sections are not intended simply to 
protect the lawyer from being replaced without being heard, 
but are also aimed at protecting the rights of the accused. The 
framers of our Constitution saw fit to grant the right to 
counsel to those accused of crime. In implementing that right 
'the Legislature saw fit to provide that, once counsel has been 
secured, such counsel cannot be removed except as provided in 
section 284. This is to protect an accused, a layman, from 
making legal decisions affecting his freedom, without the 
opportunity of chosen counsel being there and advising him 
not only of his legal rights, but of the result of his waiver 
of such rights. It is to protect an accused who is represented 
'These sections clearly apply to criminal casell. (People T. B01lc7iGrd, 
49 Ca1.2d 438, 440 [317 P.2d 971]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 22 and 24.) 
iJ~-~-
'-
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by counsel from the possibility of duress and pressure being 
exerted by the court or by the prosecution. It is to protect 
an accused who has counsel from forfeiting the protection of 
legal advice except as provided in the code section. 
This basic error was aggravated by the failure of the court 
to comply with the provisions of section 1018 of the Penal 
Code. Even if the right to have counsel present was waived, 
this section was not complied with. The majority correctly 
holds that when Martinez is supposed to have waived his 
right to counsel, the court did not "fully inform him of his 
right to counsel" as required by the section. Thus, at the 
very time he was pleading guilty he was not only permitted 
to do so without his lawyer being present, but was not then 
told of his right to counsel, even though he then had a lawyer. 
Nor was a finding made, as required by the section, that "de-
fendant understands his right to counsel and freely waives 
it." The majority correctly points out that the "court made 
no inquiry to discover whether Martinez had the experience 
and mental capacity to understand his rights or to determine 
whether his decision was the result of an intelligent choice 
freely made by him or of improper influences theretofore 
brought to bear upon him. . .• Thus there is nothing in the 
record to suggest an awareness of the statutory requirement, 
let alone an attempt to comply with it. " 
It was for these very reasons, that is, to protect an accused 
even from himself, that the three code sections were passed. 
It has heretofore been held in In re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 
235 [328 P.2d 465], and I-n re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [233 
P. 390], that convictions must be set aside where other 
provisions of section 1018 of the Penal Code have not been 
followed. The majority recognizes that those two cases are 
direct authority for the issuance of the writ in the instant 
case. In order to avoid the rule of these cases, they arc 
"disapproved." I think that those cases were correctly de-
cided. The basic theory behind them is that the Legislature 
by section 1018, and also in sectiohs 284 and 285, has seen 
fit to provide certain safeguards to protect one who waives 
counselor purports to discharge his attorney. These safe-
guards are legislative implementations of the constitutional 
provision. The Legislature determined that these safeguards 
were necessary to protect those ac~used of crime. It is not 
for this court to say that such safeguards are merely "pro-
cedural" and may be disregarded. 
Oct. 1959] IN' BE 80BO 819 152 C.2d 319; 345 P .2d 4551 
_._-------------------------
Af'. alrea.dy pointt>d out, the majority admits that error was 
committed in the pr('sent case. The implication is that, had ' 
defendant app<'aled, the error would require a reversal. But 
such error, it is held, does not require the issuance of the writ 
of habeas c.orpus. 
How could the accused appeal in the present case f Without 
being properly informed of his rights, he purported to dis-
charge his counsel and to plead guilty. He did not know that 
he had been deprived of his statutory and constitutional rights 
until long after his time for appeal had passed. By permitting I 
him to discharge his counsel illegally, the court deprived him \ 
of legal advice about an appeal at the very time he needed 
such advice. 
I think that the writ of habeas corpus should issue. 
- - ----.- -
